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A LETTER;

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

OF M. DE CALONNE.

&c. &c. &c.

PRICE ONE SHILLING.

BRITISH MUSEUM

A LETTER,

TO

THE AUTHOR

OF THE

CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE STATE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR M DCC XCVIII.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

OF

M. DE CALONNE,

&c. &c. &c.

London:

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1798.

BRITISH MUSEUM

A LETTER,

&c. &c. &c.

I HAVE read with avidity and pleaſure your new "*Conſiderations upon the ſtate of* "*Public Affairs.*" I have heard perſons well informed on theſe ſubjects, ſpeak of your performance with the higheſt praiſe. Their judgment, which will always have great influence on my opinions, had excited my curioſity; and I muſt acknowledge I have not been diſappointed in my expectation.

I have remarked, Sir, in your writing, a juſt and enlightened view of politics. Sound

reaſoning, decorated with the moſt brilliant ideas; judicious reflections, expreſſed in a ſtyle which unites elegance with energy, and the pomp of ornament to the ſelection of good taſte----as far as it is poſſible for me to underſtand the Engliſh Language. Theſe, Sir, are obvious to me in your work: and I would willingly cite many paſſages for the inſtruction of ſuch of my countrymen as underſtand the language leſs than myſelf, if I were not under ſome apprehenſion that the very honorable and flattering manner in which you have mentioned me, might render my encomiums ſuſpicious. I ought to have the ſame fear for the reception of this letter, which I addreſs to you in ſo public a manner, not having the honor of knowing you, or even your name. But what I propoſe to myſelf in writing to you, ought to ſhelter me from all appearance of partiality, particularly as (far from being ſuſpected of adulation) I may perhaps expoſe myſelf to the charge of exceſſive criticiſm; my

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purpoſe being to reproach you with having only HALF accompliſhed what you had in view, or with having had in view ONLY *half* of what is neceſſary to be accompliſhed in the preſent conjuncture of affairs.

Your *Conſiderations* tend to prove, and in fact *do prove*, " that it is the eſſential intereſt of England to continue the war with France; and that a peace, made on the ſame conditions as thoſe propoſed at Liſle, could only prove a perfidious, dangerous, and fatal peace; in ſhort, worſe than war itſelf." But may we not ſay, that to argue thus for war, and againſt peace, is what we familiarly call " to " force an open door?"---Is it neceſſary to perſuade with fine arguments, when the thing is become an inevitable neceſſity? Than that the war ought to be continued when peace is not to be obtained, nothing is plainer: and to inſiſt at this moment, to divert the Engliſh Government from a treaty they are not able

to effect---is it not to preach abſtinence to thoſe who have nothing to eat---is it to not prohibit thoſe from walking who have no legs?

In making theſe obſervations, Sir, far be it from me not to render juſtice to your intentions, which certainly are highly praiſe-worthy; and I am convinced that your pamphlet will be very uſeful in two points of view: firſt, in hindering the nation from feeling any regret at the breaking off the negociations; ſecondly, in exciting it to exert itſelf with zeal and conſtancy in whatever exertions the continuance of the war may render neceſſary; and which its glory, its real intereſt, and even its tranquillity, render indiſpenſable.

But I muſt tell you, it is not enough that you prove, what is certainly beyond all doubt. You ought to ſhew *in what* manner the war may be continued, *ſo* as to produce advantages

tages proportioned to the evils it inflicts ; *how* to manage, that this *neceſſary calamity* may not become an *inſupportable calamity* ; and how the war can be carried on, without being protracted to too long a period. I admit moſt willingly, and from conviction, that the prolongation of hoſtilities will multiply the maritime triumphs of England, and extend more and more her colonial conqueſts, and at length completely crown the glory of her flag. I alſo allow that the Engliſh, who have every thing to hope on the ſeas, have very little to fear on their own territories ; and that the project of invaſion, ſo pompouſly announced and ſo meanly prepared, will fail in its execution, if there was any thing more than *a menace* meant by it. But it is no leſs true, that the very prolongation of the war, if it is without an end, or even without a near period, would become more fatal than defeat; for however great the reſources may be, a long continuance of extraordinary efforts of itſelf

muſt exhauſt them: as what is always on the ſtretch muſt break in the end.

———" Cito rumpes arcum,
" Tenſum ſi ſemper labueris."

It is this, then, that England has moſt to dread, and which is the moſt eſſential to prevent: and on this point I think your work defective, becauſe (like many others) you ſpeculate much, but propoſe nothing.

You ſay very well, Sir, " Let us make war, until peace ſhall neither diſhonor nor endanger us; let us compenſate ourſelves by a continuance of naval victories for the alarming increaſe of power which France has acquired on the continent. Let us remember that our political intereſts, and even the ſafety of all Europe, makes it neceſſary not only that France ſhould not become a formidable maritime power, but that ſhe ſhould not be a naval power at all. Let us finiſh, then, the deſtruction of her navy: let us carry off

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or precipitate into the waves thoſe of her ſhips which ſhall dare to appear on the liquid plains where we juſtly hold dominion. Let us ſail to the ſouth or to the north with our invincible ſquadrons; let us attack and take thoſe colonies which ſtill belong to the three powers whom we combat with: let us multiply our diſtant conqueſts, at the ſame time that our ſhores are covered by citizens voluntarily armed for the defence of our hearths. Let us WAIT, with *courage*, *firmneſs*, and *patience*; till the enemy, fatigued and exhauſted by convulſive efforts, ſhall be forced to accept, even to ſolicit, a peace more agreeable to our glory and the general tranquility, than that ſhe has with ſo much arrogance diſdained to accept of----" *A peace which may replace her within her ancient limits, the only means of reſtoring the moral order:* TIME *(which is the enemy of all vicious ſyſtems, and the only enemy which ought to be oppoſed) we need not doubt will bring about this happy change.* Time *is our*

ſincere

ſincere and faithful ally; let us depend on its aſſiſtance, and make it our reſource: it is the beſt advice which can be given to this country."

It ſeems to me that this is the concluſion of your work; and, if I do not give it in ſuch good terms as you have done, it is not certainly that I wiſh to weaken the ſenſe of it; on the contrary, I try to approach the energy with which it is written. But without conteſting with you any baſis you have laid down, I maintain that the ſtructure is imperfect, and that you do not propoſe any means to eſcape the greateſt, and, I think, the only danger attendant on this war, the exceſs of its continuance.

Do you think, then, that the few Iſlands which remain for you to conquer from the French are of that importance in their eyes, that to re-poſſeſs them they will aſk a peace detrimental to thoſe advantages they have ſo much

much more at heart? Have they not already proved *how little* they feel the value of their Colonial-Poſſeſſions, when by an inconſiderate emancipation of their negro-cultivators they have rendered barren that which was productive, and with their own hands deprived themſelves of theſe poſſeſſions, which only derive their value from the labour of Slaves? On the other hand, do they not know that it is nothing to conquer, unleſs the conqueſts can be retained, and that an excentric defence, already diſproportionate to the Population of the Mother-Country, would become every day ſo much the more impoſſible, as it comes to be more extended? Have not you told them, that you only take to reſtore? And, if they have ſome reaſon to be perſuaded, that the fear of being attacked at the heart, is always ſufficient to make you abandon the extremities, can more be required to nouriſh their preſumption and make them more obſtinate in their

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hoſtile perſeverance; as long as you can do them no other injury than to ſeize what they care not to retain, and what they flatter themſelves will (in the end) be reſtored to them again without difficulty.

Their commerce will ſuffer by it; without doubt, it will be totally extinguiſhed: as far as regards their external relations, *it is already extinguiſhed.* But what will the intereſt of their colonial poſſeſſions appear in the eyes of thoſe who have reduced them to nothing? If they were not touched with them in their flouriſhing ſtate,---is it a ſhadow, an empty phantom that will move them? Believe, believe me, there are none of their colonies that appear worthy in their eyes to compenſate them for one of thoſe acquiſitions, which by rounding their frontiers, confirm their moſt real power, and appear to them as the accompliſhment and execution of their plain of *univerſal innovation.*

I will

I will ſay, further; do you believe that there remains any thing able to counterbalance in their minds the leaſt of their perſonal intereſts, their *own conveniences*, and the wiſh of ſacrificing every thing to the maintenance of their individual power? It is not as it uſed to be; that time is paſſed, when old-faſhioned politics made it neceſſary to calculate and combine a project with the national proſperity; when the care of maintaining eſtabliſhed advantages, tempered the deſire of acquiring and increaſing thoſe which were doubtful; when thoſe who governed thought it neceſſary to conſult the intereſts of thoſe they governed. This old-faſhioned foreſight and all the prudent councils attending it, are now become antiquated, ridiculous, and totally aboliſhed. The *impulſe of the moment*, the preference given to what is uſeful over what is honeſt, and the diplomacy of plunder; theſe are, you know, Sir, the only motives which govern all the actions of

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The Great Nation. To meaſure them by any rule, or to guide oneſelf by the old maxims of reputed wiſdom, would be the height of madneſs.

You call TIME to your aſſiſtance, and bid us place confidence in what you regard as your beſt ally. Good God! what an ally! ---Can you ſtill be miſtaken? and will you never ceaſe to cheriſh this deſtructive temporization? Is it not by trying to gain time, that all is loſt? How often, within the laſt eight years, has not that adage (ſo ill applied) been repeated---"Nothing violent is laſting"? How many times has it not been reiterated in our great loſs, and to the general detriment--- "Let us hope every thing from time; Give us but time: Time is a great maſter?---and how have you been benefitted by waiting for it? Is it not by ſuffering things to take their courſe, that you have permitted that fatal progreſſion of bad to worſe, the termination

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of which will be only when it is paſt a cure. Judicious Nation! on whom are placed the eyes of the whole world, who alone poſſeſs the courage to oppoſe the ſtorm; take care how you truſt to the promiſed benefits of time:--- take care how you name that as your ſincere and faithful ally, which is the deſtroyer of your forces, the waſter of your ſubſtance, the ſapper of your foundations, and the principal accomplice in carrying on your enemy's projects. I denounce it to you as ſuch, and will prove my accuſation.

Yes, time conſpires with thoſe who have ſworn your ruin. Though I am far from meddling with their ſchemes, I think in this I have pierced the ſecret of their plots.---- I have need only of one guide to penetrate through them, and this has not deceived me hitherto. This guide is their apparent intereſt, accompanied by the examination of their means. Knowing what they are, I judge with-

without difficulty of what they deſire; and, conſidering their means, I often gueſs what they will effectuate.

It is on this account that I have always held it as my certain opinion, that, in making peace with the other power, they would never conclude a peace with England: becauſe I have always concluded, from their preſent ſtate, that it was neceſſary for them to wage war with ſome power or other, and that they were able to ſuſtain it.

It was thus that, when I ſaw the premature cabals of the *modéré*'s againſt the violent party, I foretold that theſe would pervert and ruin the others: becauſe it was eaſy to foreſee that the audacity they provoked, and which had the advantage of having at its diſpoſal concentrated forces, would prevail over thoſe who had the imprudence to ſpeak before they had the power of acting, and who had only ſcattered forces.

It is thus at this moment, when people are loſt in conjectures about the expedition for which Buonaparte embarks with a great many troops in the Mediterranean, that I do not believe there is any project to bombard Naples, nor any deſign to extricate the Spaniſh Fleet, that they may ſail away to Ireland: the one not agreeing with the diſſimulation the French now diſcover, the other being an abſurdity which they have never ſhewn; and neither the one nor the other according with the kind of preparations they have made, nor with thoſe principles which ſeem to regulate their undertakings. I rather adopt an idea leſs known but more ſuitable to their intereſts, more appropriated to their ſyſtem, more analogous to their character, more aſtoniſhing in itſelf, more gigantic in its object, and therefore more likely to provoke their audacity; it is to ſail to the Dardanelles, ſet fire to the Ruſſian ſhips, reſtore the Black Sea to the Turks; and penetrate

together

together with them into Poland, there to uſurp it, under pretence of delivering it from uſurpers; to make it free in appearance, in order to ſubdue it in reallity; to republicaniſe that unhappy country, in order to render it contagious to all its neighbourhood, and to make it an advanced poſt to reach thoſe powers, who think themſelves the moſt removed from their phyſical and moral aggreſſions.

For the reſt, it is only an ideal preſumption; of which people will think as they are inclined. I do not pretend to the honor of propheſying; but I am more poſitive in what I have ſaid as to the effect of time, and, returning to my theſis, I am going to ſhew why, and for what reaſons, you ought to rank time as one of your enemies; and why your enemies may rely on it as an ally rather than you.

It is clear that time is againſt you, if it is true (and no one can doubt it) that a long interruption of the commercial relations of two countries is more detrimental to that which had the greateſt commerce, than to that who had the leaſt: that the continuance of a piratical war does more injury to that nation which has a number of merchants ſhips on the ſeas, than to that which has ſcarcely any: and that he, who has a great fortune, has everything to loſe and nothing to gain, when he continually hazards it with one who has nothing.

Will you conſider the converſe? Is it not equally clear that time is favourable to your enemies? Does not every year make thoſe ſhoots grow which add to their dominion? and does not evil always accumulate with age; and, is not the increaſe of evil the triumph of its inſtruments?

Is it not clear again that time befriends them, ſince what is not eaſy for them to effect at preſent, may become ſo in future: and if with time they can replace the ſhips they have loſt; multiply their armed tranſports, of of which they have not a ſufficient number; procure thoſe neceſſaries for their ſhips, which they ſtand in need of; and give that activity to the fleets of their allies, which they are now deprived of. It is clear that time is againſt you, if time coſts you more than it does them; and if it is certain, as it is in effect, the expenſe to England of one year of war, which amounts to twenty millions ſterling, is not more to France, in what concerns her hoſtilities or her threats rather, againſt England, than about two millions beyond the ordinary charges of her marine. So that you ſtake ten to one---and this is a game one cannot long play at, however rich one may be.

Is not this what you have to apprehend, when France has no longer a continental war on her hands?----when ſhe has nothing to occupy her but her marine, and turns all her efforts to it---encouraging privateers, and every way diſturbing your commerce, without caring for her own---haſtening to build ſhips, without letting them quit her ports---continuing to threaten England, by a deſcent on her coaſts; and taking care not to attempt it prematurely---ſhe may prolong indefinitely a war, which is incalculably more expenſive to you than to her:---a war, which will aid her to excite, and occupy, and diſtract the public ſpirit; while here, if the conteſt were to laſt, it would tire, weaken, and at length break it?

The concluſion to be drawn from this is, that, inſtead of your truſting to time (your great object), your principal care ought to be to prevent the danger and to preſerve your-

ſelves from his murderous tooth. Remember that it is not ſufficient to effect this, that you are ſuperior on the ocean, and that your iſland is invulnerable; one does not conduct you to peace, the other only drains your treaſures; always to be armed is ruinous, always to watch muſt overpower you. What is to be done then? this is the queſtion which I reproach you, Sir, with not having aſked yourſelf, in your judicious conſiderations on the preſent ſtate of affairs; this is the problem, of which I regret you have given no ſolution. I do not allow myſelf to ſupply your thoughts by my own; much leſs dare I ſuggeſt any ideas to miniſters much nore enlightened than I can pretend to be. I am a ſtranger; to form wiſhes is my duty and my part; to propoſe giving advice would be folly and preſumption. I ſee excellent precautions taken; I ſee both the ſea and land forces increaſed to the moſt formidable point; I ſee every opinion unite, every zeal enflamed with

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reciprocal ardor, all the characters of a national ſpirit opening with the higheſt degree of energy. All this I applaud with all my ſoul; and if I do not ſee what is doing beyond this, that which I think ought to co-operate with all this, that which I think more highly uſeful than this, and even neceſſary and even urgent, I perſuade myſelf it is becauſe I do not ſee all that is doing; and nothing is more probable.

Thus for example, convinced as I am that peace on the continent will be fatal for England, if ſhe alone is excluded, if ſhe has long to contend ſingly, againſt an agricultural and warlike nation, at this time amounting to thirty-three millions of inhabitants, whoſe young men have no other profeſſion, inclination, or reſource, than that of arms:---Convinced, alſo, that it is by no means impoſſible with proper addreſs to hinder a continental peace, and to revive a new coalition,

more pure in its views, more combined in its movements, and cemented by a well-underſtood and common intereſt. I cannot doubt, but that they are the ſubject of meditation, nor that the moſt efficacious inſtruments, which are not always the moſt apparent, are employed; that information is obtained of what is of the greateſt ſecreſy, not only in cabinets, but in that which ſurrounds them; and that not to be deceived by unexpected reſolutions; the key has been obtained of all thoſe ſecret reſources which determine their actions; that, at the ſame time, a conſtant watch is not ſet for all the imprudencies, all the falſe ſteps, and all the indiſcretions of an arrogant government---raſh and diſunited, in order to profit by them, and to diſconcert all their manœuvres: In ſhort; that Great Britain does not aſſume all the influence in the different courts which properly belongs to her, and which is for her an eſſential intereſt under the preſent conjuncture to acquire at any price.

Behold, then, in the exterior relations of France, what merits, and conſequently muſt fix the attention of the Britiſh Miniſtry. An equal vigilance, no doubt, fixes their eyes upon whatever paſſes in the interior of that moving theatre, and even upon every thing that can happen there. This is the capital point: how could it be the moſt neglected?

Would not he deſerve blame, who imagined that were it neceſſary to riſk a million ſterling to inſure the moſt exact information of what is paſſing, and to be faithfully acquainted with what was likely to happen, there could be the ſmalleſt heſitation to ſacrifice it for the knowledge which might ſave twenty-five or fifty millions; by giving the means of avoiding a war of one, two, or three years continuance?

Would not he deſerve blame, who ſhould doubt, that, at the moment when every thing announces

announces this ill-ordered empire will ſoon be given up to military power, they have not in this country been acquainted with the real diſpoſition which begins to manifeſt itſelf in their armies ; that they did not employ inviſible agents who are able to conduct, ever ready to find out, to diſcover, and ſeize, not only the changing appearances, but every favourable and unſuſpected one which could preſent itſelf ?

Would not he deſerve blame, whoever he may be, who ſhould ſuppoſe that they do not ſee, that, (in order not to be deceived by falſe reports, impoſed upon by illuſions, duped by ignorance or knavery, and miſled by ineffectual promiſes) they did not think it neceſſary to employ with diſcernment ſuch men as are in a ſituation to know, rather than thoſe who have only pretenſions ; thoſe who are accuſtomed to conſider the things that paſs in the ſtate, rather than thoſe who have

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no experience to guide them ; thoſe who may be attracted only by great intereſts, rather than thoſe who are caught by the ſmalleſt bait ; thoſe who preſent the means, rather than thoſe who merely ſhew their inefficacy ; thoſe who give explicit plans, and ſubmit them to examination, rather than thoſe who inſiſt on being believed on their bare word ?

To conclude : Would he not be worthy of blame, who ſhould attribute to miniſters renowned and devoted to the good of their country, the blame of rejecting any information in a conjuncture, when the re-union of all information can ſcarce ſuffice for what is demanded by a criſis without example ; and that they had not recourſe to local knowledge, when the queſtion is to form a judgement upon a foreign country ?

I would not, Sir, appear to merit this blame : I love to credit what I ought to believe,

lieve, and I am ſilent where it does not become me to ſpeak. But when I ſee a pen ſo able, ſo well-intentioned as yours, exerciſing itſelf upon the higheſt intereſts of your country, in a moment the moſt deciſive in which it can ever be placed---I cannot help remarking that it has ſtopped half way in its work, if, after having ſhewn us *what ought to be done*, it does not alſo mark *how* it may be accompliſhed.

When the manly eloquence of Demoſthenes had in the firſt part of his diſcourſe to the Athenians, ſhewn the neceſſity of making war againſt Philip, he developed to them the means of making it with ſucceſs in the ſecond.* He did not content himſelf with obſerving to them ---" that in general the date of a bad peace ought to be looked on as the date of a fatal war. ‡ He added---To prevent the danger

* The Firſt Philippic, Part II,

‡ The Second Philippic, towards the End.

with which you are threatened, not a moment is to be loſt.---It would be ſhameful to wait the event, and cry, Who would have believed it? While the ſhip is ſtill ſtruggling with the waves, the pilot, the ſailors, the paſſengers muſt all work to prevent its being up-ſett, whether by accident or by deſign, or by imprudence.---It is while we are powerful, while we have ſtill great armies, infinite reſources, and a high reputation, that it becomes us to act on every ſide.---And without limiting ourſelves to a defence (our preparations in this caſe being already made) we muſt ſend ambaſſadors to every court, to Peleponneſus, to Rhodes, to Chios, and even to the King of Perſia; becauſe it is his intereſt as much as ours to prevent Philip; from overturning every thing.* It was not only to exite and ſtir up a general confederacy againſt a common enemy, that this ſtateſman and orator ex-

* Third Philippic, towards the Concluſion.

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horted the Athenian people: It was not only upon the vigor of his efforts united to his other powers, that he eſtabliſhed the moſt favorable preſages; he bid them, depend on the protection that Heaven would afford them, and the execration in which their enemies were held, even in the heart of their own ſtates. "Do not imagine (ſaid he,) that fortune is for ever attached to the car of your enemy; that ſhe muſt eternally follow him, ſtep by ſtep, as if he were a God: he is not ſurrounded by affection, even amongſt thoſe who appear the moſt devoted to him; there are thoſe who hate him, thoſe who fear him, thoſe who envy him; no one is ſincerely attached to him."----May not the ſame be ſaid of the Directory? "Shall we believe that thoſe who ſurround him and are oppreſſed by him are exempt from the ſame paſſions that govern other men? If they ſmother their rage, and repreſs their diſcontents, it is becauſe they ſee no one to aſſiſt them; and what is looked on

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as apathy in them, ought only to be attributed to the negligence, to *that cowardly manner of temporiſing*, which I tell you ſhould relinquiſh this very day.---Should any misfortune happen to our enemies, or any happy circumſtance await us for our intereſt, to bring about the change I wiſh, and which I expect with confidence, you would be able in the hurry and confuſion of a new revolution to do any thing, provided you take ſuch ſteps as may put it in your power to profit by it: but, being no more prepared than you are, having no fixed plan, torn by internal diviſions, and diſtracted by the debates of orators,---ſhould the gates of Amphipolis be actually ſpread open to you, you would not enter.*"

So ſaid Demoſthenes, and he was liſtened to. England poſſeſſes alſo her Demoſthenes's---Why ſhould not they tell her, as he

* Firſt Philippic.

did,

did, addreſſing a government more wiſe than the Athenian Government, " The hatreds and diſſentions which are fomenting in the boſoms of your enemies, will be a more ſure and efficacious ſuccor to you, than any weak and vain temporiſation. Do, then, all you can to foment their diſſentions: It is a great maſs of inflammable matter; put the match to it, and the exploſion will follow; and you will then be able to profit by it, provided you take the proper ſteps before hand." And you may do it; for why, like the Grecian orator, ſhould they not ſend ambaſſadors to every power intereſted in oppoſing an impenetrable dike to the torrent which overturns every thing? Send to them men, who are well informed, and furniſhed with ſuch powers and inſtructions and means, that they may be able to take without delay ſuch determinations, as the public ſafety requires. There is no doubt of effecting it; all reſiſtance ceaſes, when there are the means of ſucceſs, in the force

of

of reaſon, the proof of intereſt, the concurrence of efforts, and above all ability and the choice of proper meaſures; for every will has its principle of action; it is only neceſſary to know it and to ſecure it.

But it is not always in the common path, that it is to be found; it is not always that it reſides in the importance of motives; the greater or leſs action of the ſprings depends upon the quality of the ſubſtances upon which they act; and that which has been remarked at all times, "that the greateſt effects are often produced by the ſlighteſt cauſes," at preſent deſerves to be remembered more than ever. Succeſs will infallibly follow every where, if the proper inſtruments are employed.

Nevertheleſs one cannot be confident that the different powers of Europe will equally feel the neceſſity of repelling the danger which

which advances towards all with ſuch gigantic ſtrides;---let us leave theſe chimerical hopes to the deep-reaſoning ſpeculator, who (having marked out a large plan in too ſmall a ſpace, ---the intereſts and politics of the principal nations of Europe) * concludes that, at this time, there remain no other alternatives but that

* I ſpeak of the work, entitled the "*Tableau ſpecu-*" *latif de L'Europe en* 1798;" a work made to attract curioſity, and only to ſatisfy it to a certain degree; but of which I cannot ſpeak with commendation, without ſaying I am far from adopting the errors it contains: for example---

"That it was the diſſipation of the finances which threw the French Government into the hands of the nation, who have violently reſumed their rights." *Page* 60.

"That the actual conſtitution of France is eſſentially good." *Page* 144.

"That the ancient frontiers of France were perfect." *Page* 145.

"That the diſorders in their finances are become irremediable." *Page* 147.

"That

that of "an univerſal peace, which will eſtabliſh their reſpective rights on a ſolid and equitable baſis; or elſe, a general war,"---which a new coalition of the European powers will maintain againſt France, until ſuch time as force or inclination may compel her to conſent to the general peace; the conditions of which will be regulated, not by the weak and ridiculous congreſs at Raſtadt, but an auguſt aſſemblage of the plenipotentiaries of all the ſovereigns, which ſhould be called

"That the preparations for the deſcent on England coſts Two Hundred Millions per month." *Page* 148.

"That, if in the war of Europe, coaleſced againſt France, the French Nation ſhould be overcome, liberty would be baniſhed from the face of the earth, and deſpotiſm would not even ſuffer *thought* to exiſt." *Page* 153.

"That, next to liberty, equality is the ſecond good of nature." *Page* 154.

"That it belongs to the Executive Power to indicate the law; to the Repreſentative Body to diſcuſs it; and to the Legiſlative Body (conſiſting but of a few members) to compoſe it." *Page* 156.

the congreſs of the univerſe. A beautiful project! without doubt; a noble and elevated idea; a ſentiment both generous and juſt!--- But if I may blame your work, Sir, for leaving us ſtill without the *means*, I have much greater reaſon to reproach the book I now quote, for leaving us without the *poſſibilities*. It has long been ſaid, that an univerſal peace is the dream of an honeſt man; one may now ſay that a general war is the vow of a military man, celebrated and well-meaning. But fourteen different nations, confederated for war or reconciled by peace, only repreſent to me a chariot with fourteen wheels all drawing different ways. It is quite enough to wiſh once more, after the paſt unhappy proof, to renew a triple alliance with Auſtria, who ought now to feel how much ſhe would be degraded, and without any advantage to herſelf, by the peace propoſed at Raſtadt:--- Pruſſia, whoſe young king cannot be inſenſible to the glory of repairing, reſtoring, and

ſaving

ſaving every thing :---and England, who cannot ceaſe to be haraſſed by inquietude, and exhauſted with expenſes, but by the diſtraction of a continental war.

The author of *The Speculative Sketch of Europe in* 1798, has very much exaggerated the danger of a partial deſcent, when he maintains that *a body of ten thouſand men, once intrenched upon the ſhore where they diſembark*, would be ſufficient to *leave the Engliſh* no other reſource, *even before a defeat*, than an *humiliating peace* and *dearly purchaſed*. You, Sir, think very differently, and you think right: but he is not wrong, when he ſays, that the very threat of a great deſcent, holds all England in check, ruins her by fatiguing cruiſes, by the armament of her coaſts, by a ſtanding army: and that England cannot ſupport that ſtate of perplexity, ſo long as France can ſupport the appearance of it.

It is certain that ſuch a menace does more miſchief than the reality itſelf, and that this country cannot deliver itſelf from the inquietude it occaſions; but by provoking elſewhere a war, which ſhould employ the troops which threaten her. Every day multiplies the reaſons for believing that this war is kindling; and I cannot doubt, but the Britiſh Government will ſeize with avidity for this effect, the overtures which appear to offer themſelves ſpontaneouſly. But that upon which we may place the ſtrongeſt reliance, is the haughty, turbulent, and diſorganiſing ſpirit of the French Oligarchy. It would be too much to be dreaded, if it united prudence with audacity, moderation with ſucceſs; the juſtneſs of its views to the activity of its intrigues, and the wiſdom of its counſels to the valour of its troops.

I have the honor to be,

SIR,

12 MR 38 Yours, &c.

DE C******.

[In page 14, line 14, for *pervert* read *prevent.*]

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